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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Remotely piloted (or unmanned) aircraft are rapidly emerging as a new sector of civil 
aviation. As regulatory agencies work to integrate these aircraft into the existing 
aviation system, they must contend with a unique set of human factors that are not yet 
fully identified or understood.  
 
These aircraft are sometimes referred to as drones, uninhabited aircraft, or unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs). Throughout this chapter, the terminology of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (2015) will be used. The term “remotely piloted aircraft” 
(RPA) will be used to refer to the aircraft, in both the singular and plural. The term 
“remotely piloted aircraft system” (RPAS) will be used when the intent is to refer to the 
entire system, comprising the aircraft, its control station, communication links and 
other elements. The workstation of the remote pilot will be referred to as the “remote 
pilot station” (RPS) or control station.  
  
Any discussion of RPAS is complicated by the diversity of the sector and the rapid rate 
at which it is developing. RPA range from micro air vehicles the size of insects, to large 
jet aircraft such as the Global Hawk. In between are electric rotorcraft, numerous fixed-
wing aircraft, and balloons that can remain aloft for extended periods, climbing and 
descending as necessary to take advantage of prevailing winds. To further complicate 
matters, many RPAS include features not typical of conventional aviation, such as 
catapult launch systems, electric engines, and solar cells (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Three examples of remotely piloted aircraft. (1) The 18 kg, catapult-launched Insitu ScanEagle; (2) 6,700 kg 
High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) Global Hawk; (3) AeroVironment Helios Prototype, a solar powered flying wing 
designed for long-duration, high-altitude missions in the stratosphere. 
 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160014467 2019-08-29T17:03:01+00:00Z
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Much of the recent growth of this sector has involved small electric rotorcraft used for 
aerial photography, site surveys, and inspections of buildings and infrastructure 
(Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, 2016). The FAA (2016) has 
released regulations that allow lightweight RPA to be flown near the ground within 
sight of the pilot. Currently, however, no regulations are in place to allow larger, more 
capable RPA to routinely fly beyond pilot line-of-sight, in airspace shared with 
conventional aircraft. This chapter focuses on the human challenges that must be 
addressed before these RPA can be fully integrated into the civil airspace system1. 
 
The potential uses of these aircraft include pipeline and rail track inspection, police and 
firefighting, mineral exploration, agriculture, mapping, wildfire monitoring, and 
environmental research. Long-endurance fixed-wing systems and free balloons have 
potential as High Altitude Platforms (HAPs) for telecommunications or remote sensing 
tasks that might otherwise have required a satellite. In the not-too-distant future, 
converted airline aircraft may operate as unmanned freighters (Smith, 2010).  
 
Despite the diversity of designs and missions, all RPAS have features in common, 
notably the physical separation of the pilot from the aircraft, control via radio signals, 
and a remote control interface. These characteristics, in turn, introduce a set of human 
factors that are not typical of conventional aviation, some of which have not yet been 
the focus of extensive research. A key objective of this chapter is to raise questions and 
identify areas in need of research. 
 
2. HUMAN FACTORS OF REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
 
RPA have experienced a significantly higher accident rate than conventionally piloted 
aircraft. In the early 2000s, accident rates for some RPA were between 30 and 300 
times higher than the comparable rate for general aviation (Tvaryanas, Thompson, & 
Constable, 2006). In the years 2006-2010, MQ-9 RPA operated by US Customs and 
Border Protection had an accident rate of 53 per 100,000 hours, although this figure 
must be interpreted with caution as it was based on a relatively small total of flying 
hours (Kalinowski & Allen, 2010). The US Army has reported an accident rate of 49.3 
per 100,000 flying hours for its RPA, compared with 4.4 for its manned aircraft. The 
army acknowledges, however, that the rate for RPA may be a low estimate due to 
significant underreporting of RPA mishaps (Prather, 2013). Statistics for accidents in 
                                                        
1 The FAA (2013) has stated that future integration of RPA into civil airspace will require that each RPA be 
under the control of a pilot who will comply with all ATC instructions, no pilot will control more than one RPA 
at a time, RPA will be capable of flight under instrument flight rules, and autonomous operations will not be 
permitted.   
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which the aircraft is destroyed enable more reliable comparisons to be made between 
RPA and manned aircraft as there is less potential for under-reporting or differences in 
definitions. In 2015, the most recent year for which data are available, MQ-9 operated 
by the US Air Force (USAF) were destroyed at the rate of 4.0 per 100,000 hours flown. 
This is a significant improvement over earlier years, yet is still markedly higher than the 
figure for the USAF’s manned aircraft, which were destroyed in accidents at the rate of 
0.41 per 100,000 flying hours (USAF, 2015).  
 
The higher accident rate for RPA can be partly explained by technological factors such 
as the use of non-certificated components and a lack of system redundancy. However, 
inadequate consideration of human factors by system designers has also contributed to 
the accident record (Tvaryanas, 2004; Williams, 2004).  
 
The following sections contain an overview of the human challenges of remotely 
piloted aircraft, with a focus on the points of difference between this sector and 
conventional aviation. The illustrative quotes throughout the text are from remote 
pilots who participated in focus groups conducted by Hobbs, Cardoza, and Null (2016). 
Pilots were asked to recall a hazardous event or error that had occurred when 
operating an RPA. As well as revealing human-system integration challenges, their 
reports also illustrate the positive contribution that humans make to the performance 
of highly-automated, remotely operated systems. 
 
2.1. Reduced sensory cues 
 
Lacking the ability to hear the sound of hail on the fuselage, smell an onboard fire, feel 
turbulence, or notice ice accumulating on a windshield, the remote pilot relies almost 
entirely on visual displays to monitor the state of the aircraft. Even when the RPA is 
equipped with a camera, the image quality may be limited, and the field of view may 
be reduced to a narrow “soda straw” picture.  
 
The sensory isolation of the remote pilot may make it more difficult to identify and 
recover from threats and errors, a function that is performed routinely by the pilot of a 
manned aircraft (Helmreich, 2000). For example, one remote pilot was apparently 
unaware that the aircraft was flying upside down shortly before it crashed (Whitlock, 
2014). In many cases, these displays present data in textual form, which may further 
impede the flow of information to the pilot. In the following example, the pilot was 
unaware that the RPA had a stuck throttle until it failed to level off: 
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“We fly based on digital gauges. We don't hear or feel anything, like RPM 
changes …. The aircraft is supposed to level off, at say, 5,000', and there is a 
delay due to data link to know if it actually leveled off. … As opposed to a real 
aircraft [where] you can feel the airplane leveling off, I couldn't determine if it 
was still climbing until I noticed it was 300' past its command altitude.” 
 
A solution may be to provide the remote pilot with a greater variety of sensory inputs, 
including haptic or aural cues (Arrabito et al., 2013; Giang & Burns, 2012) and graphical 
displays (e.g., Kaliardos & Lyall, 2015; McCarley & Wickens, 2005). Research is needed 
to identify the sensory cues that will be most useful to the remote pilot, and then to 
make the case that the benefits would justify the added cost and complexity. 
 
2.2 Control via radio link 
 
Unlike the mechanical control cables or fly-by-wire systems of a conventional aircraft, 
the RPAS fly-by-wireless control link introduces control latencies and the possibility of 
complete interruption in some circumstances. RPAS technology and pilot procedures 
must each be designed to accommodate these limitations. Figure 2 shows the elements 
of a typical RPAS, including the RPA, the control station, and the communication links. 
Two distinct links are shown: a ground-based link that is used when the RPA is 
operating within line-of-sight of a ground antenna, and a satellite link that provides 
communication over greater distances.  
 
 
Figure 2. The Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) consists of the Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), the Remote 
Pilot Station (RPS), and the associated communications systems. 
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A pilot command from the control station can take around 100 ms to be uplinked to 
the RPA if the signal is transmitted from a nearby ground antenna. Most of this delay is 
the result of signal processing at either end rather than the time it takes radio waves, 
traveling at the speed of light, to reach the aircraft. With an equivalent delay on the 
downlink, the total round-trip latency between a command and the response observed 
on the pilot’s display can become noticeable. If control is via satellite, additional 
processing steps and the distance that must be traveled by the signal can produce 
round-trip latencies of 1000 ms or more (Tvaryanas, 2006a). Unlike a hobbyist flying a 
radio-controlled aircraft, whose commands are delayed on the uplink, but who can 
directly observe the aircraft response in real time, the RPA pilot must contend with the 
sum of the uplink and the downlink delays. 
 
Tracking tasks can be impacted by command-response delays of less than 100ms. 
Longer delays and variable latencies increase the difficulty of these tasks even further 
(Wickens, 1986). An RPA that relied on continuous pilot control inputs to maintain 
stable flight would be difficult to control via a satellite link, and would also be unable to 
tolerate link interruptions. For these reasons, virtually all RPA require some level of on-
board automation, and the role of the pilot becomes that of a supervisory controller 
rather than a human-in-the-loop manual controller.  
 
The introduction of highly-automated airline aircraft in the 1980s led to improvements 
in safety and efficiency (Orlady & Orlady, 1999) but was also accompanied by new 
challenges as pilots transitioned to the role of managers of automated systems. Data 
entry errors and loss of situational awareness became areas of increasing concern, and 
terms such as mode confusion, automation surprise, and automation complacency 
were coined to express the emerging issues. The RPAS sector is currently experiencing 
some of the same problems with systems that were developed with little apparent 
regard for human factors principles. It remains to be seen whether remote operation 
via radio link will make it more difficult for the pilot to manage automated systems, 
possibly exacerbating the impact of clumsy automation. In the following case, the 
behavior of the RPA surprised the remote pilot, who was nevertheless able to 
intervene and recover the situation.  
 
“I … put the airplane into a holding pattern. …The aircraft turned in the opposite 
direction than what I wanted it to do. To correct the situation, I over-rode the 
aircraft. I had the aircraft go into the hold again and the aircraft did it again.” 
[The aircraft was successfully re-directed on a second attempt]. 
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2.2.1. Link management 
 
In addition to managing systems on-board the aircraft, the remote pilot must also 
manage the control link. Before the flight commences, the pilot may be assigned 
control frequencies to use throughout the flight, and may be required to check that 
unrelated transmissions are not occurring on the assigned channels. With the control 
system reliant on radio signals, the standard preflight control check becomes 
particularly important. During flight planning the pilot must take into account the 
predicted strength of the link throughout the intended flight and develop a three-
dimensional picture of the link strength at various altitudes and distances from an 
antenna located on the ground. A signal coverage map may show this information in a 
2D format, typically displaying shadows where the signal will be blocked by terrain or 
obstructions. As the distance between the aircraft and the ground antenna increases, 
the aircraft may need to fly higher to maintain a link with the ground station. A link 
strength indicator is a critical display in the RPS, although pilots report sometimes using 
less precise cues, such as a “snowy” camera image to warn of an impending loss of link. 
There appears to be no published research examining how best to support pilot 
awareness of actual and predicted link status. 
 
2.2.2. Loss of link: Implications for the remote pilot  
 
No radio control link can be guaranteed to be 100% reliable, and there will be 
occasions when the link will be unavailable. A pre-programmed lost link procedure 
enables the RPA to continue flight in a predictable manner until the link is resumed. 
The procedure may involve either a simple maneuver such as climbing to re-gain a 
signal, or a more complex plan, such as flying to a pre-determined position. Rather than 
being perceived as an emergency, the activation of the lost link procedure can be seen 
as a response to a non-normal situation, analogous to a diversion or a go-around in a 
conventional aircraft.  
 
A lost link event can consist of three stages, as shown in Figure 3. In stage 1, the link 
has been interrupted, but the aircraft continues to fly in accordance with the last 
command received from the pilot. Some link outages will last a few milliseconds (ms), 
whereas others may extend for minutes or even hours. It would be disruptive if the 
RPA started to fly its lost link procedure each time a brief link interruption occurred. 
Therefore, an on-board timer is needed to measure the duration of the outage, and 
activate the lost link procedure after a pre-set interval has elapsed. In the terminal 
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area, the lost link procedure may need to commence after an outage of a few seconds. 
Elsewhere, the RPA may be able to safely continue along its planned flightpath for an 
extended period before entering its lost link procedure.  
 
 
Figure 3. Stages of a lost link event. 
 
“Nuisance” lost link events have sometimes prompted remote pilots to delay the 
activation of the lost link procedure, or inhibit it until the aircraft has reached a certain 
location. In this example, the pilot used a workaround to extend the duration of stage 
1, to prevent the RPA from repeatedly turning for home:          
    
“The airplane … made many turnarounds due to it being out of link then … it 
would reacquire and … return on mission. This affected fuel burn. [So I] set 
time-out feature just short of the actual mission duration.” 
 
If the aircraft will remain in stage 1 for a significant time, the pilot must be aware that 
each command sent to the aircraft could be the last, if a link interruption were to 
occur. For example, a temporary turn towards rising terrain may become irreversible if 
the link is interrupted before a follow-up command can be sent to the aircraft. 
 
In stage 2 of a lost link event, the RPA’s pre-programmed lost link procedure is 
activated. Different lost link procedures will be appropriate according to the location of 
the aircraft and the stage of flight. The RPA pilot must therefore remain aware of the 
current lost link procedure, updating it as frequently as every 10 minutes to ensure that 
it has not become stale, or would not create a hazardous situation if activated (Neville, 
Blickensderfer, Archer, Kaste, & Luxion, 2012). In the following example, a problem 
with the lost link procedure was detected during a control handover:   
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“At the beginning of the flight, the lost link procedure was valid, but the 
procedure was not updated later in the flight. At one point, had the lost link 
procedure been activated, it would’ve had the aircraft fly through terrain in an 
attempt to reach the next waypoint. However, the aircraft didn’t lose link and 
the error was caught in the handover to the next set of operators.” 
 
In the third stage of the lost link sequence, the link is re-established and the aircraft 
transitions back to pilot control. The pilot must ensure that any control inputs made 
while the link was interrupted do not result in sudden changes in aircraft state when 
the link is reestablished. Depending upon the length of the outage, and the location 
and state of the aircraft, the pilot may need to evaluate whether the original flight plan 
can be resumed.  
 
Loss of link can occur for a variety of technical and human reasons. The pilot of a 
conventional aircraft cannot accidently disconnect the cockpit from the rest of the 
aircraft. The remote pilot however, can make errors that will inadvertently achieve this 
effect. Potential human causes of lost link include flying beyond the range of the 
ground station, flying into an area where the signal is masked by terrain, frequency 
selection errors, abrupt aircraft maneuvers, physical disruptions to plugs and cables, 
and electronic lock-outs in which a screen lock or security system prevents access. In 
addition, the pilot must be alert to radio frequency interference, whether from 
malicious or unintentional sources. At the time of writing, the author was aware of no 
studies examining the human causes of lost links. 
 
2.2.3. Loss of link: Implications for Air Traffic Control  
 
The behavior of the aircraft in the event of a lost link must be predictable not only to 
the pilot, but also to air traffic control (ATC). Controllers must be able to determine 
how and when each RPA will respond during a lost link event. A simple programmed 
maneuver, such as a climb or a turn towards a specific location, may be easily included 
in the flight plan. However, more complex maneuvers that change throughout the 
flight may be more difficult to present to ATC. On occasions, common cause failures 
have resulted in multiple RPA losing link simultaneously (ICAO, 2015). Although this 
would hopefully be a rare event, it could present ATC with a complicated traffic picture. 
 
To prevent the RPA from executing a lost link procedure that contradicts an ATC 
instruction received before the link interruption, there may be occasions where ATC 
will ask the pilot to inhibit the lost link procedure for a set time, or until the aircraft has 
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reached a particular location. As well as a pre-assigned squawk code to indicate a lost 
link, ATC may need to know the time remaining until the RPA will commence its lost 
link maneuver. A countdown timer could conceivably be included in the aircraft’s data 
block on the controller’s scope.  
 
2.2.4. The relay of voice communications via the control link 
 
Voice communication between the remote pilot and ATC is typically relayed from the 
control station to the RPA via the command link, and then re-transmitted by an on-
board radio (RTCA, 2007). In a similar way, transmissions from ATC and other pilots in 
the vicinity are received by the radio on board the RPA and then relayed to the remote 
pilot via the downlink. An advantage of this system is that the remote pilot can 
participate in the “party line” communications of pilots and ATC, but this may come at 
the cost of noticeable delays. Voice latencies can increase the likelihood of step-ons, in 
which two people attempt to transmit simultaneously. RPAS voice latencies are likely 
to be most problematic when a satellite link is involved, as illustrated by the following 
report: 
  
“There is a delay between clicking the press-to-talk and talking. This is very 
difficult to manage when in very busy airspace, and listening for a gap to talk. 
Sometimes by the time we press the talk button, with the satellite delay, the 
gap is gone and we step on other aircraft.”  
 
Telecommunications research has found that 250 ms one-way delays can significantly 
disrupt phone conversations (Kitawaki & Itoh, 1991). Consistent with this finding, FAA 
policy requires that communications systems deliver an average one-way delay 
between pilot and ATC voice communications of less than 250 ms (FAA, 2012). Several 
studies have examined the impact of controller voice latencies that might be 
introduced by future communications networks (e.g., Sollenberger et al., 2003; Zingale, 
McAnulty, & Kerns, 2003). These studies have generally found that one-way latencies in 
controller transmissions of up to 350 ms are tolerable. In a simulation study, Vu et al. 
(2015) found that remote pilot voice delays of 1.5 and 5 seconds produced comparable 
rates of step-ons; however further research is required to identify the dividing line 
between tolerable and disruptive voice latencies for remote pilot voice 
communications. 
   
A further implication of the RPAS voice relay system is that a loss of link will not only 
prevent the pilot from sending commands to the RPA, but it will also interrupt voice 
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communication at this critical time. Future communication systems are likely to solve 
this problem. For now, the pilot must rely on a telephone to regain communication 
with ATC, as described by a remote pilot:   
 
‘We were constantly … talking to ATC via VHF to keep them updated and 
coordinated. We lost link. Then we realized that we didn’t have ATC’s phone 
number. We were able to finally call ATC, but it took a few minutes to find the 
number.” 
 
2.3. Implications for “see and avoid” 
 
Before RPAS can be integrated seamlessly into civil airspace, the remote pilot must 
have a means to “see and avoid” other aircraft whenever conditions permit (14 CFR 
91.113; ICAO, 2011) and to comply with other air traffic requirements that rely on 
human vision. Detect and Avoid (DAA) systems for RPAS have been a major focus of 
recent human factors research, including work by NASA to support the development of 
industry standards for DAA displays (Fern, Rorie, & Shively, 2014; Rorie & Fern, 2015). 
Detecting and avoiding other aircraft is generally considered to consist of two related 
concepts, (1) remain well clear and (2) collision avoidance. To remain well clear of 
other aircraft, the remote pilot must maintain an awareness of surrounding traffic and 
make any necessary separation maneuvers before the intruder aircraft poses an 
imminent threat. In controlled airspace, the pilot would be expected to coordinate 
with ATC before maneuvering, as illustrated by the following report:  
 
“I was flying on a heading assigned by ATC. We have a display that shows traffic. 
On this display I was watching a flight block coming towards my aircraft. I 
realized that we were on a converging course so I queried ATC, and they had no 
info on it. We found the traffic through swinging the ball [pointing the on-board 
camera]. The pilot of the converging [aircraft] was completely oblivious to us. 
He was on a different frequency. I had to maneuver to avoid him.” 
 
The rules of the air currently leave it to the pilots of conventional aircraft to judge what 
it means to remain well clear of other aircraft. The introduction of DAA technology 
requires that the term be defined precisely. An advisory committee developing 
standards for DAA systems has defined “well clear” as meaning that the RPA and the 
threat aircraft do not come within 4000 ft horizontally and 450 ft vertically when 
operating away from terminal areas. A time based-metric, broadly equivalent to 35 
seconds to closest point of approach, is also included in the definition (RTCA, 2016). 
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Keeping RPA well clear of other aircraft is not only a matter of safety, but will also 
ensure that the addition of RPA to the civil airspace system does not cause concern for 
conventional pilots, that Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) alerts and 
resolution advisories are not triggered excessively, and that ATC workload is not 
increased. 
 
Displays to assist the pilot in remaining well clear can be informative, suggestive or 
directive. An informative display provides traffic information but provides no further 
guidance to the pilot. A suggestive display provides the pilot with a range of possible 
maneuvers and may also display “no-fly” areas, leaving the pilot free to formulate a 
course of action. Directive displays give the pilot a single recommended maneuver to 
remain well clear. Directive guidance has been found to produce more rapid pilot 
response times than informative or suggestive displays; however the certification 
requirements for a directive system are too great for them to be considered a 
‘minimum requirement’ (Rorie, Fern, & Shively, 2016). In simulation trials comparing 
informative and suggestive displays, Rorie et al. (2016) found that suggestive displays 
reduced the time it took the remote pilot to initiate a maneuver to remain well clear, 
reduced the size of the maneuver, and resulted in fewer and less severe losses of well 
clear.  
 
If the RPA fails to remain well clear of traffic, it may be necessary to make a collision 
avoidance maneuver. The Airborne Collision Avoidance System for unmanned aircraft 
(ACAS Xu), currently under development, will provide a collision avoidance system 
specifically for RPA that will be interoperable with the TCAS of manned aircraft. Given 
the possibility of link outages, and the need for a rapid pilot response, it is likely that 
future RPA equipped with ACAS Xu will need to be capable of making an autonomous 
response to a resolution advisory.  
 
Given the long-recognized limitations of the see-and-avoid principle (Hobbs, 1991), a 
remote pilot with a well-designed DAA display will almost certainly have a better 
awareness of traffic than the pilot of a conventional aircraft whose only traffic 
information comes from the view out the window. Furthermore, if the system is 
capable of detecting aircraft that are not equipped with transponders, the remote pilot 
may be aware of traffic that does not appear on the controller’s scope. Consequently, 
DAA systems could change the patterns of communication between pilots and 
controllers. For example, the workload of controllers could be raised by remote pilots 
calling with concerns about nearby traffic.  
 
12 
 
 
 
2.4. Control transfer 
 
A unique feature of RPAS is that control may be transferred in-flight between adjacent 
consoles, or between geographically separated control stations. Transfers can also 
involve a change of control link, such as from satellite to terrestrial radio 
communications. Handovers produce an elevated risk of human error in many task 
environments, including air traffic control, aircraft maintenance, and medicine (Parke & 
Kanki, 2008). This also appears to be true for RPAS. Tvaryanas (2006a) notes that the 
control of a long-endurance aircraft may be transferred multiple times during the 
course of a single flight, with each transfer contributing to a cumulative risk of error or 
misunderstanding.  
 
Control transfers require careful briefings and checklist discipline. Several RPA 
accidents and incidents have involved failures to match the control settings on the 
receiving control station with that of the relinquishing control station, as illustrated by 
the following example involving a transfer during ground checks: 
 
“… we had the aircraft engine at idle with the parking brake set, but when the 
radio handover switched to XXX, he didn’t have the parking brake set and the 
power was set at 80% …. The result was the engine revving up, and the aircraft 
jumping its chocks.”   
 
Three possible styles of inter-control station transfer can be identified (see Figure 4). A 
seamless transfer would involve the instantaneous switching of control from one 
control station to the next. In a “make before you break” transfer there is an overlap in 
command authority between the receiving and relinquishing control station, which is 
analogous to having two cockpits connected simultaneously to the aircraft. If both 
control stations have the ability to transmit commands to the RPA, there is clearly a 
need for careful coordination to ensure that both pilots do not attempt to uplink 
commands simultaneously. The “break before you make” style requires that the 
relinquishing control station shuts off its command link to the aircraft before the 
receiving control station establishes its command link, although both control stations 
may continue to receive the downlink from the RPA during the process. During the 
transfer gap, which could last several seconds or longer, neither pilot will be able to 
send commands to the aircraft or speak with ATC via the aircraft’s on-board radio. 
Although this style of transfer is currently used by some RPAS, the FAA (2013) has 
stated that it will not be acceptable for future operations in civil airspace. Despite the 
criticality of RPAS control transfers, many questions remain unanswered. For example: 
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What design features are needed in the RPS to facilitate transfers? How should pilots 
confirm that control settings are consistent between the RPS before transferring 
control?   
 
 
Figure 4. Three potential styles of control transfer. 
 
 
 
2.5. The control station environment 
 
The control stations of sophisticated RPAS increasingly resemble industrial control 
rooms or office workstations (see Figure 5). The space may need to accommodate not 
only pilots, but also technicians, payload operators, and maintenance personnel2. As a 
remote pilot has noted: “People come and go, opening and closing doors and holding 
casual conversations. Ringing telephones, whispered remarks, and other disturbances 
can interrupt critical operations - such as approach and landing maneuvers that 
demand silence and concentration.” (Merlin, 2013, p.132). 
 
   
Figure 5. Control station for General Atomics MQ-9 (left), NASA’s Global Hawk, and Raytheon’s advanced Common 
Ground Station System (CGCS). 
 
                                                        
2 Additionally, there may be no reason why the RPS should not be wheelchair accessible. 
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Anecdotal reports indicate that during critical in-flight events, operational personnel 
will sometimes gather at the control station to observe or offer support. It is unclear 
how the presence of additional personnel affects crew resource management. One 
remote pilot expressed it this way: 
 
“In manned aircraft it is clear who is in command, but with UAS operations, 
there are multiple people who have a sense of responsibility for the aircraft. So 
when there is something that needs attention many people run to the GCS 
[Ground Control Station].” 
 
Applying a blanket “sterile cockpit” policy to the control station may create other 
problems. Maintaining vigilance during periods of task under-load may emerge as one 
of the greatest human factors challenges for RPAS (Cummings, Mastracchio, 
Thornburg, & Mkrtchyan, 2013). Thompson et al. (2006) found high levels of boredom, 
reduced mood and chronic fatigue among United States Air Force MQ-1 Predator 
pilots. They identified the control station environment as a major contributor to 
boredom. Well-meaning efforts to control distraction, such as eliminating windows or 
prohibiting visitors may only serve to increase the monotony of the piloting task. 
Furthermore, comfortable, un-stimulating environments can unmask fatigue, making it 
especially difficult for personnel to remain alert (Moore-Ede, 1993). In future, control 
stations must be designed to maximize pilot alertness. Solutions could include allowing 
pilots to work in a standing position, or vigilance monitoring devices similar to those 
found in the cabs of locomotives.  
 
A final observation concerns the implications of the RPS environment for maintenance 
personnel. Unlike the cockpit of a conventional aircraft, the RPS is accessible to 
maintainers while the aircraft is in-flight. Scheduled maintenance, such as software 
updates, should probably never occur while the RPA is airborne. However, non-
scheduled corrective maintenance may sometimes be necessary. Examples are 
diagnosing and rectifying console lock-ups, re-booting computer systems, and 
troubleshooting problems with cable connections. Maintenance error is a significant 
threat to the reliability of aviation systems, especially when the system is in an 
operational mode while maintenance is occurring (Reason & Hobbs, 2003). If corrective 
maintenance is to be performed on ground-based elements of the RPAS while the RPA 
is airborne, the prevention and management of maintenance error will be especially 
important (Hobbs, 2010). 
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2.6. Controls and displays 
 
The cockpits of conventional aircraft evolved gradually over decades, incorporating 
principles learned from accidents and incidents. Standard features such as the “Basic T” 
arrangement of primary flight instruments, and controls that can be distinguished by 
touch, have helped to ease workload and reduce pilot error. Current-generation 
control station interfaces rarely comply with aviation standards, and they frequently 
contain an assortment of consumer electronics including computer monitors, pull-
down menus, keyboards, and “point-and-click” input devices (Waraich, Mazzuchi, 
Sarkani, & Rico, 2013).  
 
The human factors deficiencies of control stations have been widely described (e.g., 
Cooke, Pringle, Pedersen, & Connor, 2006). Physical ergonomics problems include 
controls that cannot be reached from the pilot’s seat, difficult-to-read fonts and color 
schemes, and unguarded controls that are susceptible to bumping or inadvertent 
activation (Hobbs & Lyall, 2016a; Hopcroft, Burchat, & Vince, 2006; Pedersen, Cooke, 
Pringle & Connor, 2006).  
 
Control stations have also suffered from more subtle deficiencies in cognitive 
ergonomics.  A well-designed RPS would include features such as feedback to the pilot 
to confirm that a command has been received, consistency across controls and 
displays, appropriate prioritization of information provided by alarms and displays, and 
control interfaces that minimize the need for complex sequences of inputs to perform 
routine or time-critical tasks (Hobbs & Lyall, 2016b). Yet these principles have not 
always been applied in practice. For example, Pestana (2012) describes the process 
that must be performed by the pilot of NASA’s Ikhana RPA to respond to an ATC 
request to “ident”, a routine action that will highlight the aircraft’s return on the ATC 
radar screen. The pilot must perform a sequence of seven steps using a trackball to 
navigate pull-down menu options. The same task in a manned aircraft can be 
performed in a single step. 
 
In the following example, a display presented information in a form that was not easily 
useable by the remote pilot:    
 
“Pitch and roll indicators are digital, not analog. Makes it difficult to capture the 
trend of what the aircraft is doing. … We sometimes write down numbers so we can 
keep track, and that adds to our workload.” 
 
16 
 
 
 
The same interfaces that make it difficult for the pilot to perform a task correctly can 
also make it easy to make errors. Keyboard or menu-based controls may be especially 
subject to skill-based slips when pilots have developed well-learned action sequences 
that can be triggered unintentionally:  
 
“When I activated the gear extension, I turned off the engine by mistake. …  I 
accidentally pressed the engine shutdown switch with my left hand because 
the gear engage button is next to the engine shutdown switch and I was in a 
hurry due to time pressure.” 
 
The list below gives a flavor of design deficiencies that have been identified in current 
RPS: 
 
 Presentation of non-integrated or raw data that require the pilot to perform 
additional cognitive processing to extract meaning (Tvaryanas & Thompson, 2008; 
Neville et al., 2012). 
 Lack of design consistency across controls and displays (Gawron, 1998). 
 Complicated, multi-step sequences required to perform routine or time-critical 
tasks, often involving menu trees (Cooke, et al., 2006; Pestana, 2012). 
 Reliance on text displays to the exclusion of other sources of information, 
potentially introducing a foveal bottleneck that restricts the flow of information to 
the pilot (Hobbs & Lyall, 2016b; Tvaraynas, 2006b).  
 Use of non-standard or counterintuitive language in text messages (Hobbs & Lyall, 
201b). 
 Non-intuitive automation and inadequate mode annunciation (Cooke, et al., 2006; 
Williams, 2007). 
 Lack of feedback on pilot control inputs or system states (Tvaryanas & Thompson, 
2008). 
 Heavy reliance on memory to keep track of system status and flight plan details 
(Neville et al., 2012). 
 Multi-function displays and controls, particularly where a control may perform both 
a critical and a non-critical function (Tvaryanas & Thompson, 2008; Hobbs & Lyall, 
2016b; Neville et al., 2012). 
 Need for complex instrument scans (Tvaryanas & Thompson, 2008). 
 Difficulty in detecting and correcting errors (Neville et al., 2012). 
 Poor hierarchy of presentation. e.g. critical displays that can be obscured by non-
critical pop-up windows, and a proliferation of display screens  (Hobbs & Lyall, 
2016b). 
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 Reliance on keypress sequences and shortcuts, increasing the risk of skill-based 
slips and muscle memory errors (Neville et al., 2012). 
 Single auditory alarm tones with multiple meanings, and alarms that lose their 
impact due to repeated activation (Hobbs, 2010; Arrabito et al., 2010).    
 
Some of the design deficiencies in RPS might have been avoided had existing human 
factors standards been applied. In other cases, the problems reflect a lack of RPAS-
specific standards. Several human factors guides for military RPAS currently exist 
(Under Secretary of Defense, 2012; NATO, 2007, 2009). However, there are currently 
no human factors standards for non-military RPAS operating in civilian airspace. In 
order to avoid a piecemeal approach to guidelines development, Hobbs and Lyall 
(2016a) have proposed that future guidelines for civil RPAS should (a) supplement 
existing human factors guidelines by focusing on the unique requirements of 
unmanned aviation, and (b) should be based on a systematic analysis of the tasks that 
the pilot must perform via the RPS.  
 
Figure 6. Responsibilities of the remote pilot. 
 
Figure 6 shows the primary safety-related tasks of the remote pilot when operating in 
airspace shared with conventional aircraft. Some of these tasks are common across 
aviation but are especially challenging for the remote pilot, perhaps due to the lack of 
direct sensory cues or communication latencies. In other cases, the remote pilot has 
unique responsibilities. These include monitoring the status of control links, control 
transfers, and flight termination. The draft RPS guidelines proposed by Hobbs and Lyall 
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(2016b) are structured around the tasks shown in figure 6, with a focus on displays and 
controls that would be unique to RPAS. 
 
2.7. Emergencies and flight termination 
 
Faced with a serious on-board problem, such as an engine failure, the pilot of a 
conventional aircraft will first consider whether a landing can be made at a nearby 
airport. If that is not possible, an off-airport emergency landing may be necessary. Even 
if the aircraft sustains damage, an emergency landing can be considered a success if 
the occupants are unscathed. The absence of human life on board an RPA markedly 
changes the nature of emergency decision-making for the remote pilot. In essence, the 
“manned mindset” that leads a pilot to attempt to save the aircraft and its occupants 
may not transfer to unmanned aviation, where the safety risks are borne by the 
occupants of other aircraft and uninvolved individuals on the ground. In an emergency, 
the remote pilot may be faced with the following options: 
 
 attempt a landing at a suitable airfield,  
 attempt a controlled off-airport landing or ditching,  
 activate a parachute system, or 
 activate a flight termination system that will cause the aircraft to descend to a 
controlled impact, while minimizing risk.  
 
Flight termination systems introduce the risk of inadvertent activation. It is worth 
noting that the first loss of a Global Hawk RPA occurred when a flight termination 
message was sent by mistake (Hobbs, 2010). The guidelines of Hobbs and Lyall (201b) 
recommend a range of precautions for parachute or flight termination systems. These 
include a requirement for two distinct and dissimilar actions to initiate a flight 
termination, aural and visual warnings to the crew before the final activation of the 
system, and controls designed to minimize the likelihood of unintentional activation.  
 
The flight planning for a large RPA can be expected to include the identification of 
suitable sites for flight termination. For example, in 2007, NASA successfully used its 
Ikhana RPA to monitor wildfires in the western United States (Buoni & Howell, 2008). 
As part of the risk management plan for this mission, NASA identified a large number of 
potential sites for emergency landings or crashes, as shown in Figure 7.   
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Figure 7. Over 280 emergency landing sites were identified for NASA’s Ikhana wildfire monitoring missions. The 
aircraft could have been directed to glide to one of these sites in the event of a complete and irreversible engine 
failure. 
 
Even if potential sites for flight termination have been pre-selected, in the event of an 
emergency, it may be necessary to confirm that the selected site is clear of people and 
property. If the link is likely to be interrupted as the aircraft descends, the pilot may 
have to act quickly to interpret sensor data from the RPA, select a suitable site, and 
send the necessary commands to the RPA at early stage in the descent. Automated 
decision-support aids that recommend a site after analyzing sensor data may assist the 
pilot in these time-critical situations (Patterson, McClean, Morrow, & Parr, 2012). 
 
2.8. Required competencies of flight crew 
 
The FAA (2013) has stated that RPAS capable of operating in the US National Airspace 
System must have a pilot in command, however it is not clear what qualifications this 
person will need to possess. Despite the diversity of RPAS, there are likely to be core 
competencies that will apply across systems, related to the pilot responsibilities shown 
in Figure 6. Recommended training requirements for non-military remote pilots 
operating in civil airspace have been produced by SAE (2011). These requirements 
cover the unique issues such as control transfer and link management, as well as 
identifying syllabus items from manned aviation that would no longer be relevant to 
RPAS. Although SAE assumes that manned experience will not be necessary to operate 
an RPAS, this issue is far from settled. Some military RPAS are operated by personnel 
with no flying experience, yet it seems likely that conventional piloting experience will 
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provide the remote pilot with insights or attitudes that contribute to safe operations. 
Remote pilots may also require non-technical skills training focusing on unique issues 
such as flight termination decisions, communication and coordination with remote 
crew members, control transfers, and the impact of reduced sensory cues on threat 
and error management.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that, with the pilot no longer co-located with the aircraft, the 
task of piloting could be outsourced to virtually anywhere in the world, just as airline 
maintenance tasks have been outsourced to low cost locations. One advantage could 
be a reduced need for pilots to work during the night, if control can be transferred 
between control stations in different time zones.  
 
3. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
In conclusion, the safe and efficient integration of RPAS into civil airspace will require 
thorough human factors input into their design and operation. In many cases, existing 
human factors knowledge from aviation and other industries can be applied directly to 
RPAS. For example, cockpit design standards could help to improve some control 
station interfaces. In other cases, RPAS operations introduce a unique set of human 
factors that have not yet been clearly identified or examined. 
 
Much of this chapter has been focused on unanswered questions. Virtually every 
aspect of RPAS, from interface design, interaction with ATC, and pilot decision-making 
demands attention from the human factors profession. For example, what will be the 
RPAS equivalent of the “Basic T” flight instruments? Is decision-making affected by the 
lack of shared fate between the remote pilot and the aircraft? How can we make best 
use of the positive contribution that humans make to the performance of remotely 
operated systems? 
 
Some of the emerging RPAS issues considered in this chapter will increasingly apply to 
conventional aircraft as the divide between remotely piloted and conventional aircraft 
becomes less distinct. Modern airline aircraft are already equipped with 
communication links that enable technical personnel on the ground to receive real-
time performance data from engines and other systems. Recent airline crashes 
resulting from pilot incapacitation or malicious acts may accelerate the development of 
systems that will enable flight crew on the ground to take control of an airliner in an 
emergency. The act of transferring control from the cockpit to the ground would 
instantly transform a conventional aircraft into a passenger-carrying RPAS. Researchers 
21 
 
 
 
have only just begun to examine the numerous human factors and security 
considerations of this concept (Comerford et al., 2013).  
 
Throughout the 20th century, developments in aviation human factors often occurred 
in response to accidents, an approach sometimes referred to as “tombstone safety.” In 
the years ahead, we must glean every available lesson from RPA accidents. However, 
we must also aim to identify RPAS human factors in a less costly manner. Incident 
investigations, simulations and applied research will be essential to ensure that the 
integration of RPAS into civil airspace can occur safely and efficiently.  
 
 
Acknowledgements 
Thanks are due to Jay Shively at NASA Ames Research Center, and Cynthia Null at NASA 
Langley for their support via the NASA UAS in the NAS project and the NASA 
Engineering and Safety Center. I would also like to express my appreciation to Vanui 
Barakezyan, Edward Barraza, Tamsyn Edwards, Jillian Keeler, Joel Lachter, Jeffrey 
McCandless, Randy Mumaw, and Yuri Trujillo for their helpful comments on drafts of 
this chapter. Lastly, thanks are due to the remote pilots who participated in focus 
groups and generously shared their knowledge and experience.  
 
4. REFERENCES 
 
Arrabito, G. R., Ho, G., Lambert, A., Rutley, M., Keillor, J., Chiu A., Au, H., & Hou, M. (2010). 
Human factors issues for controlling uninhabited aerial vehicles: Preliminary findings in support 
of the Canadian forces joint unmanned aerial vehicle surveillance target acquisition system 
project (Technical Report 2009-043). Toronto, Canada: Defence Research and Development 
Canada. 
 
Arrabito, G. R., Ho, G., Li, Y., Giang, W., Burns, C. M., Hou, M., & Pace, P. (2013). Multimodal 
displays for enhancing performance in a supervisory monitoring task reaction time to detect 
critical events. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 57 
(1), 1164-1168. doi:10.1177/1541931213571259 
 
Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International. (2016). Commercial UAS exemptions 
by the numbers. Retrieved from http://www.auvsi.org/auvsiresources/exemptions 
 
Buoni, G. P. & Howell, K. M. (2008, September). Large unmanned aircraft system operations in 
the National Airspace System – the NASA 2007 Western States Fire Missions. Paper presented 
at the 26th Congress of International Council of the Aeronautical Sciences (ICAS), Anchorage, 
Alaska. doi:10.2514/6.2008-8967 
22 
 
 
 
 
Comerford, D., Brandt, S. L., Lachter, J., Wu, S., Mogford, R., Battiste, V., Johnson, W. J. (2013). 
NASA’s single-pilot operations technical interchange meeting: Proceedings and findings 
(NASA/CP—2013–216513). Moffett Field, CA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Ames Research Center. Retrieved from http://www.sti.nasa.gov 
 
Cooke, N. J., Pringle, H. L., Pedersen, H. K. & Connor, O. (Eds.). (2006). Human factors of 
remotely operated vehicles. San Diego, CA: Elsevier. 
 
Cummings, M.L., Mastracchio, C., Thornburg, K.M., Mkrtchyan, A. (2013). Boredom and 
distraction in multiple unmanned vehicle supervisory control. Interacting with Computers, 
25(1), 34-47. doi: 10.1093/iwc/iws011 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2012). National airspace system requirements document 
(NAS-RD-2012). Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2013). Integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in 
the national airspace system (NAS) Roadmap. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2016). Operation and certification of small unmanned aircraft 
systems. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Fern, L. C., Rorie, R. C., & Shively, R. J. (2014, October). NASA's UAS integration into the NAS: A 
report on the human systems integration phase 1 simulation activities. Proceedings of the 
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 58 (1), 49 – 53. 
doi:10.1177/1541931214581011 
 
Gawron, V. J. (1998). Human factors issues in the development, evaluation, and operation of 
uninhabited aerial vehicles. AUVSI '98: Proceedings of the Association for Unmanned 
Vehicle Systems International, Huntsville, AL, 431-438.  
 
Giang, W. & Burns, C.M. (2012). Sonification discriminability and perceived urgency. 
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 56, 1298-1302. 
doi:10.1177/1071181312561377 
 
Helmreich, R.L. (2000). On error management: Lessons from aviation. British Medical Journal, 
320 (7237), 781-785. 
 
Hobbs, A. (1991). Limitations of the see and avoid principle. Canberra, Australian Capital 
Territory: Bureau of Air Safety Investigation. Retrieved from www.atsb.gov.au/publications. 
 
23 
 
 
 
Hobbs, A. (2010). Unmanned aircraft systems. In E. Salas & D. Maurino (Eds.) Human factors in 
aviation, 2nd edition (pp. 505-531). San Diego: Elsevier. 
 
Hobbs, A., & Lyall, B. (2016a). Human factors guidelines for unmanned aircraft systems. 
Ergonomics in Design, 24, 23-28 
 
Hobbs, A., & Lyall, B. (2016b). Human factors guidelines for remotely piloted aircraft system 
(RPAS) remote pilot stations (RPS).NASA Contractor report. Retrieved from http://human-
factors.arc.nasa.gov/ 
 
Hobbs, A., Cardoza, C., & Null, C. (2016, June). Human factors of remotely piloted aircraft 
systems: Lessons from incident reports. Paper presented at the Conference of the Australian 
and New Zealand Societies of Air Safety Investigators, Brisbane, Australia. Retrieved from 
http://asasi.org/ 
 
Hopcroft, R., Burchat, E., & Vince, J. (2006). Unmanned aerial vehicles for maritime patrol: 
Human factors issues (DSTO publication GD-0463). Fishermans Bend, Victoria, Australia: 
Defence Science and Technology Organisation. 
 
International Civil Aviation Organization. (2011). Unmanned aircraft systems (Circular 328, AN 
190). Montreal: Author. 
 
International Civil Aviation Organization. (2015). Manual on remotely piloted aircraft systems 
(RPAS) (Doc 10019 AN/507). Montreal: Author. 
 
Kaliardos, B., & Lyall, B. (2015). Human factors of unmanned aircraft system integration in the 
national airspace system. In K.P. Valavanis, G.J. Vachtsevanos (Eds.), Handbook of unmanned 
aerial vehicles (pp. 2135-2158). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer. 
 
Kalinowski, N., & Allen, J. (2010). Joint statement before the House of Representatives, 
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global 
Counterterrorism, on the role of unmanned aerial systems on border security. Retrieved from 
http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/pasttest/10test/kalinowski2.htm.  
 
Kitawaki, N., & Itoh, K. (1991). Pure delay effects on speech quality in telecommunications. IEEE 
Journal on Selected Area in Communications, 9 (4), 586-593. doi:10.1109/49.81952 
 
McCarley, J. S., & Wickens, C. D. (2005). Human factors implications of UAVs in the national 
airspace (Technical Report AHFD-05–05/FAA-05–01). Atlantic City, NJ: Federal Aviation 
Administration. 
 
24 
 
 
 
Merlin, P. W. (2013). Crash course: Lessons learned from accidents involving remotely piloted 
and autonomous aircraft. Washington DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
 
Moore-Ede, M. (1993). The 24 hour society. London: Piatkus. 
 
Neville, K., Blickensderfer, B., Archer, J., Kaste, K., & Luxion, S. P. (2012). A cognitive work 
analysis to identify human-machine interface design challenges unique to uninhabited aircraft 
systems. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 56th Annual Meeting, 56 
(1), 418-422. doi:10.1177/1071181312561094 
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2007). Standard interfaces of UAV control systems (UCS) 
for NATO UAV interoperability (NATO Standardization Agreement [STANAG] 4586, Edition 2). 
Retrieved from http://nso.nato.int/nso/ 
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2009). Unmanned aerial vehicle systems airworthiness 
requirements (NATO Standardization Agreement [STANAG] 4671). Retrieved from 
http://nso.nato.int/nso/ 
 
Orlady, H.W. & Orlady, L. M. (1999). Human factors in multi-crew flight operations. Aldershot, 
UK: Ashgate. 
 
Parke, B. K., & Kanki, B. G. (2008). Best practices in shift turnovers: Implications for reducing 
aviation maintenance turnover errors as revealed in ASRS reports. The International Journal of 
Aviation Psychology, 18 (1), 72-85. doi:10.1080/10508410701749464 
 
Patterson, T., McClean, S., Morrow, P., & Parr, G. (2012). Modelling safe landing zone detection 
options to assist in safety critical UAV decision making. Procedia Computer Science, 10, 1146-
1151. doi:10.1016/j.procs.2012.06.164 
 
Pestana. M. (2012). Flying NASA unmanned aircraft: A pilot's perspective. Retrieved from 
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/ 
 
Pedersen, H. K., Cooke, N. J., Pringle, H. L, & Connor, O. (2006). UAV human factors: Operator 
perspectives. In, N. J. Cooke, H.L. Pringle, H.K. Pedersen, & O. Connor (Eds.), Human factors of 
remotely operated vehicles (pp. 21–33). Oxford: Elsevier. 
 
Prather, C. (2013). Online report of Army aircraft mishaps. Flightfax, 26. Retrieved from 
www.safety.army.mil 
 
Reason, J., & Hobbs, A. (2003). Managing maintenance error. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
 
25 
 
 
 
Rorie C., & Fern, L. (2015). The impact of integrated manoeuvre guidance information on UAS 
pilots performing the detect and avoid task. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society Annual Meeting, 59 (1), 55-59.  doi:10.1177/1541931215591012 
 
Rorie, C., Fern. L., & Shively, R. J. (2016, January). The impact of suggestive maneuver guidance 
on UAS pilots performing the detect and avoid function. AIAA Infotech @ Aerospace. 
doi:10.2514/6.2016-1002. 
 
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics. (2007). Guidance material and considerations for 
unmanned aircraft systems (Document DO-304). Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics. (2016). Minimum operational performance 
standards (MOPS) for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) detect and avoid (DAA) systems. 
Washington, DC: Author. 
 
SAE. (2011). Pilot training recommendations for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) civil 
operations (SAE ARP 5707). Warrendale, PA: Author. 
 
Smith, F. W. (2010). Delivering innovation. Interview at Wired Business Conference. Retrieved 
from http://library.fora.tv/ 
 
Sollenberger, R. L., McAnulty, D. M., & Kerns, K. (2003). The effect of voice communications 
latency in high density, communications-intensive airspace (No. DOT/FAA/CT-TN03/04). Atlantic 
City: Federal Aviation Administration, Technical Center. 
 
Thompson, W. T., Lopez, N., Hickey, P., DaLuz, C., Caldwell, J. L., & Tvaryanas, A. P. (2006). 
Effects of shift work and sustained operations: Operator performance in remotely piloted 
aircraft (OP-REPAIR) (Report No. HSW-PE-BR-TR-2006-0001). Brooks City, TX: United States Air 
Force. 
 
Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations. General Operating and Flight Rules, 14 CFR § 91 
(2016). 
 
Tvaryanas, A.P. (2004). Visual scan patterns during simulated control of an uninhabited aerial 
vehicle. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 75 (6), 531-538. doi:10.1.1.485.6217 
 
Tvaryanas, A, P. (2006a). Human factors considerations in migration of Unmanned 
Aircraft System (UAS) operator control (Report No. HSW-PE-BR-TE-2006–0002). Brooks City, TX: 
United States Air Force, Performance Enhancement Research Division. 
 
Tvaryanas, A. P. (2006b). Human systems integration in remotely piloted aircraft operations. 
Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 77 (7), 1278-1282. doi:10.1.1.628.5468  
26 
 
 
 
 
Tvaryanas, A. P., Thompson, B, T., & Constable, S, H. (2006). Human factors in remotely piloted 
aircraft operations: HFACS analysis of 221 mishaps over 10 years. Aviation Space and 
Environmental Medicine, 77 (7), 724–732. 
 
Tvaryanas, A. P., & Thompson, B, T. (2008). Recurrent error pathways in HFACS data: Analysis 
of 95 mishaps with remotely piloted aircraft. Aviation Space and Environmental Medicine, 79 
(5), 525–532. 
 
Under Secretary of Defense. (2012). Unmanned aircraft systems ground control station human-
machine interface: Development and standardization guide. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
United States Air Force. (2015). Q-9 flight mishap history. Retrieved from 
http://www.afsec.af.mil/ 
 
Vu, K. L., Chiappe, D., Strybel, T. Z., Fern, L., Rorie, C., Battiste, V, & Shively, R. J. (2015). 
Measured response for UAS integration into the national airspace system (NASA/TM—2015–
218839). Moffett Field, CA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Ames Research 
Center. Retrieved from http://www.sti.nasa.gov 
 
Waraich, Q., Mazzuchi, T., Sarkani, S., & Rico, D. (2013). Minimizing human factors mishaps in 
unmanned aircraft systems. Ergonomics in Design, 21 (1), 25-32. 
doi:10.1177/1064804612463215 
 
Whitlock, C. (2014, June 23). ‘Stop saying ‘uh-oh’ while you’re flying': Drone crash pilot quotes 
unveiled. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com 
  
Wickens, C. D. (1986). The effects of control dynamics on performance. In K. R. Boff,  
L. Kaufman, & J. P. Thomas (Eds.), Handbook of perception and human performance (pp. 39.1-
39.60). New York City, New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
 
Williams, K. W. (2004). A summary of unmanned aircraft accident/incident data: Human factors 
implications (Technical report DOT/FAA/AM-04/24). Washington, DC: Federal Aviation 
Administration. 
 
Williams, K.W. (2007). An assessment of pilot control interfaces for unmanned aircraft (Report 
No. DOT/FAA/AM-07/8). Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration. 
 
Zingale, C. M., McAnulty, D. M., & Kerns, K. (2003). The effect of voice communications latency 
in high density, communications-intensive airspace phase II: Flight deck perspective and 
comparison of analog and digital systems (DOT/FAA/CT-TN04/02). Atlantic City International 
Airport, NJ: Federal Aviation Administration, William J. Hughes Technical Center. 
27 
 
 
 
 
 
